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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal by Marshall Rountree, from a judgment of 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, requires 
us to decide if the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, was unreasonable in concluding that alleged 
violations of Rountree‟s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
did not undermine the reliability of the sentence he received 
for an armed robbery he committed in Camden County, New 
Jersey. Applying provisions of the Antiterrorism and 
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Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), we conclude that 
the New Jersey appellate court‟s decision in this case was not 
contrary to and did not unreasonably apply federal law, nor 
was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We will therefore 
affirm the District Court. 
I. 
 
A. 
Within the span of two weeks in July of 1993 Marshall 
Rountree, who also uses the name Mark Hawkins, perpetrated 
two unrelated firearm incidents in New Jersey: an armed 
robbery in Camden County, and a shooting in Essex County. 
The Essex County shooting occurred on a street, after 
Rountree and two companions encountered the boyfriend of 
one of the men‟s sisters. The men exchanged words, then 
blows. At some point, Rountree drew a revolver and shot the 
boyfriend, rendering him paraplegic. The Camden County 
robbery occurred two weeks later when Rountree covered his 
face with a white towel, approached a woman from behind a 
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dumpster in her apartment building‟s parking lot and said, “I 
have a gun. Give me your purse or I‟ll shoot you.” She 
surrendered the purse, and called the police after he fled the 
scene. Minutes later, Rountree, carrying a white towel, was 
spotted near a shopping mall. Officers arrested him and 
recovered various items that had been inside the woman‟s 
purse, but did not recover a pistol. Rountree waived his 
Miranda rights and provided a taped confession in which he 
claimed he robbed the woman with a toy pistol and then 
discarded it into a nearby wooded area. Later, during plea 
bargaining, he swore under oath that the pistol was real. 
Both crimes were subject to New Jersey‟s “Graves 
Act,” which sets forth mandatory penalties if a person “used 
or was in possession of a firearm” during or in flight from a 
violent offense. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:43-6(c), (d), (g), 
(h), 2C:44-3(d). Of particular importance to this appeal is a 
Graves Act repeat-offender provision, which substantially 
enhances sentences if a person who possesses or uses a 
firearm during a crime “has been previously convicted of an 
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offense involving the use or possession of a firearm.” 
§ 2C:43-6(c). 
In 1993, a grand jury in Camden County indicted 
Rountree for first-degree armed robbery and third-degree 
hindering justice. The same year, he was also indicted in 
Essex County for conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree 
attempted murder, second-degree aggravated assault, third-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and second-degree 
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Plea 
negotiations occurred separately in each county. Soon after 
they began, Rountree‟s Camden County attorney obtained 
judicial and prosecutorial permission to consolidate the 
Camden County and Essex County negotiations into one plea 
bargaining session, pursuant to Rule 3:25A-1 of the New 
Jersey Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part: 
[W]hen a defendant has charges pending in 
more than one county at any stage prior to 
sentencing, either the defendant, or the 
prosecutor in any such county with the consent 
of the defendant, may move before the 
presiding judge of the criminal part in the 
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county in which consolidation is sought, or 
before any judge designated to hear such 
motion, for consolidation for purposes of 
entering a plea or for sentencing. 
Although there was every indication that a Rule 3:25A-1 
motion would have been granted, Rountree‟s Camden County 
attorney failed to file one and, as a result, the negotiations 
continued separately. 
As early as March of 1994, prosecutors offered 
Rountree a choice regarding his Camden County charges: he 
could plead guilty to non-Graves Act offenses in return for a 
12-year sentence, or he could plead guilty to a Graves Act 
offense in return for a 9-year sentence. If accepted, either 
offer would have resolved Rountree‟s Camden County 
charges, but not his Essex County Charges. Rountree‟s 
attorney wrote him a letter explaining the enhancement effect 
that a Graves Act conviction would have on any sentence that 
might be imposed for the shooting in Essex County, and 
recommended the 12-year non-Graves Act offer. Nonetheless, 
Rountree chose the 9-year offer. Under the plea agreement, 
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Rountree‟s sentence was to run concurrently with any 
sentence imposed for the still-unresolved charges related to 
the shooting he had committed in Essex County. 
In the fall of 1994, after entering his plea in Camden 
County but before the court accepted the plea and sentenced 
him, Rountree was transferred to Essex County to address the 
shooting-related charges there. Prosecutors and Rountree 
were unable to reach a plea agreement, and the case went to 
trial. In October of 1994, a jury convicted Rountree of first-
degree attempted murder, second-degree aggravated assault, 
and two separate firearm crimes. He received a 20-year 
Graves Act sentence. Soon after he was sentenced, however, 
and under threat of appeal, prosecutors agreed that faulty jury 
instructions required a new trial. Before retrial, and after 
much negotiation, Rountree pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose—
both of which are Graves Act offenses. The Essex County 
Court accepted Rountree‟s plea and sentenced him to two 
concurrent 10-year prison terms, during the first half of which 
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he would be ineligible for parole. At this time Rountree stood 
convicted of his first Graves Act offense. 
Rountree then returned to Camden County in July of 
1995 to complete sentencing on his plea to the robbery-
related offenses still pending there. Somewhat unexpectedly, 
the Camden County Court rejected the plea agreement. It 
explained that the 9-year sentence Rountree had accepted 
before his transfer to Essex County was either too lenient for 
the crimes he had committed or, alternatively, was illegal. 
The court reasoned thusly: even if Rountree had used a toy 
pistol (as he initially claimed) the 9-year sentence the 
government had offered was too lenient under New Jersey 
law; alternatively, if the pistol was real, then the sentence was 
illegal under the Graves Act (which requires extended prison 
time for repeat firearm offenders) given Rountree‟s recent 
Graves Act conviction in Essex County. Rountree responded 
by withdrawing his guilty plea. 
The Camden County case was set for trial in April of 
1996, and plea negotiations continued. On the day of trial, the 
9 
Camden County prosecutor offered Rountree a 20-year 
sentence with a 7-year term of parole ineligibility, to run 
concurrently with the 10-year sentence he had received in 
Essex County (hereinafter, the “April 1996 offer”). Rountree 
rejected it. He explained to the court that he was not 
interested in the prosecutor‟s offer because he believed that 
the time he had already served in Essex County was “dead 
time”—i.e., that it would not count toward either of his 
sentences. The trial court explained that regardless of whether 
he accepted the plea, his time served would indeed count 
toward his Essex County sentence, but would not count 
toward his Camden County sentence. Rountree reiterated his 
rejection of the plea, the trial proceeded, and a jury convicted 
him of first-degree armed robbery (a Graves Act crime) and 
of hindering justice. 
The Camden County sentencing judge determined that, 
given Rountree‟s prior Essex County Graves Act conviction, 
Rountree was a person who had “been previously convicted” 
of a Graves Act crime. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6(c). The 
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court then applied the Graves Act‟s repeat-offender provision 
and imposed a 50-year sentence, with parole eligibility after 
16 years and 8 months, to run consecutively with his 10-year 
Essex County sentence. 
B. 
Rountree challenged his conviction and his sentence 
on direct appeal, and the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Appellate Division, affirmed. State v. Hawkins, 719 A.2d 689 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey denied Rountree‟s petition for certiorari. State v. 
Hawkins, 744 A.2d 1211 (N.J. 1999). 
Rountree then sought post-conviction relief on several 
grounds, including that his Camden County attorney‟s failure 
to consolidate his Camden County and Essex County plea 
bargaining into one, lump-sum negotiation violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. See State v. Rountree, 906 A.2d 
1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). The state court agreed 
that the Camden County attorney‟s failure to file a motion to 
consolidate fell below what is expected of “counsel” within 
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the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, but held that the failure 
to consolidate was not prejudicial to Rountree‟s case because 
the record indicated that he would not have accepted any 
offer likely to emerge from a consolidated negotiation. Id. at 
1138. The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied review. State 
v. Rountree, 926 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2007). This exhausted 
Rountree‟s state court remedies. 
Rountree then filed in the District Court an 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. See Rountree v. Balicki, No. 
07-5763, 2008 WL 4950008 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008). His 
petition challenged the state court‟s post-conviction ruling as 
to his Camden County (but not his Essex County) sentence, 
alleging that deficient performance by his Camden County 
counsel undermined the reliability of his Camden County 
sentence. On November 18, 2008, the District Court applied 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) and denied Rountree‟s petition on the merits. Id. 
at *1. 
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Less than 30 days later, on December 15, 2008, 
Rountree filed in the District Court a pro se motion for 
extension of time to file for a certificate of appealability. On 
February 24, 2009, he filed a motion for a certificate of 
appealability with this Court. One year later, on February 24, 
2010, we certified the appealability of three issues: (1) 
whether his untimely notice of appeal deprived this Court of 
jurisdiction; (2) whether his trial counsel was ineffective, and, 
if so; (3) whether his trial counsel‟s conduct was prejudicial 
to his case. 
Five months later, on July 29, 2010, Rountree filed a 
motion to expand his certificate of appealability to include 
certification of: (1) whether the state court acted contrary to, 
or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when 
it held that the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not retroactively 
invalidate Rountree‟s Camden County sentence; (2) any 
relevant sentencing implications from his not having been 
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indicted for possession of a firearm in Camden County; (3) 
whether the Camden County trial judge made improper 
responses to jury questions; and (4) whether “other crimes 
evidence and unindicted juvenile acts” were improperly 
admitted during his Camden County trial. We granted the 
motion. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 because Rountree‟s habeas petition alleged that 
he was incarcerated in violation of the United States 
Constitution, see Rountree v. Balicki, No. 07-5763, 2008 WL 
4950008, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008), and because Rountree 
exhausted his state court avenues for relief, see State v. 
Rountree, 926 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2007). We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) because Rountree met the 
requirements for a timely pro se notice of appeal, and because 
he obtained a certificate of appealability. See id. § 2253(c)(1). 
The government contends that Rountree‟s notice of 
appeal was untimely, thus depriving us of jurisdiction over 
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his appeal from the District Court. We disagree. This case 
falls within Rule 4(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
because this is a civil case to which the United States is not a 
party. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a notice of appeal “must 
be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the 
judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Our Local 
Appellate Rules relax certain formalities for pro se habeas 
petitioners, including Rountree: 
The court will deem a document filed by a pro 
se litigant after the decision of the district court 
in a civil, criminal, or habeas corpus case to be 
a notice of appeal despite informality in its form 
or title, if it evidences an intention to appeal. 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4 (2010) (“Notice of Appeal in Pro Se 
Cases”). “This rule is designed to emphasize that the 
jurisdictional requirement of a notice of appeal is met in a pro 
se case by the filing of an informal document.” L.A.R. 3.4 
(Committee Comments). 
In this case, the District Court entered its denial of 
habeas corpus relief on November 18, 2008. Rountree, 2008 
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WL 4950008, at *2. Twenty-seven days later, on December 
15, 2008, Rountree filed a pro se motion for extension of time 
to file for a certificate of appealability. See Rountree v. 
Balicki, No. 07-5763, 2009 WL 223421, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 
27, 2009) (“Petitioner‟s motion for an extension of time is 
dated December 12, 2008 and was docketed by the Clerk on 
December 15, 2008.”). By indicating he would file for a 
certificate of appealability, his pro se motion “evidence[d] an 
intention to appeal,” which means it constituted a notice of 
appeal pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 3.4. Because 
Rountree filed that motion within the 30-day timeline 
proscribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A), his notice of appeal was 
timely. And, because he obtained a certificate of 
appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
III. 
The state court denied Rountree‟s Strickland v. 
Washington claim on the merits, which means our review of 
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is subject to AEDPA. See 28 
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U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2254(d). Under AEDPA, our task is to 
determine only whether the state court‟s adjudication of 
Rountree‟s Strickland claim: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. 
§ 2254(d). Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, we read 
§ 2254(d) to require three distinct legal inquiries. See, e.g., 
Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). 
The first is whether the state court decision was “contrary to . 
. . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). The 
second is whether the state court decision “involved an 
unreasonable application of” such law. § 2254(d)(1). And the 
third is whether the state court decision “was based on an 
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented” to the state court. § 2254(d)(2). 
The test for § 2254(d)(1)‟s “unreasonable application 
of” clause is as follows: “[a]n „unreasonable application‟ 
occurs when a state court „identifies the correct governing 
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s decisions but 
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts‟ of petitioner‟s 
case.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (quoting 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 519, 520 (2003)). For purposes of 
§ 2254(d)(1), “[i]t is not enough that a federal habeas court, in 
its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm 
conviction that the state court was erroneous.” Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal quotations 
omitted). “Under § 2254(d)(1)‟s „unreasonable application‟ 
clause . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ 
simply because that court concludes in its independent 
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 75-
76 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)). 
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Rather, “[t]he state court‟s application of clearly established 
law must be objectively unreasonable” before a federal court 
may grant the writ. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. 
The test for § 2254(d)(1)‟s “contrary to” clause is 
whether the state court decision “applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme 
Court‟s] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is 
materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 
Court but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 
U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, and 
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)). Of course, 
a state court‟s resolution of a question that the Supreme Court 
has not resolved can be neither contrary to, nor an 
unreasonable application of, the Court‟s precedent. See Kane 
v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005). 
The test for § 2254(d)(2)‟s “unreasonable 
determination of facts” clause is whether the petitioner has 
demonstrated by “clear and convincing evidence,” 
§ 2254(e)(1), that the state court‟s determination of the facts 
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was unreasonable in light of the record. See Rice v. Collins, 
546 U.S. 333, 338-339 (2006) (“State-court factual findings, 
moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden 
of rebutting the presumption by „clear and convincing 
evidence.‟”) (quoting § 2254(e)(1)) (citing Miller-El v. 
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005))); see also Simmons v. 
Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Under the § 2254 
standard, a district court is bound to presume that the state 
court‟s factual findings are correct, with the burden on the 
petitioner to rebut those findings by clear and convincing 
evidence.”). Importantly, the evidence against which a federal 
court measures the reasonableness of the state court‟s factual 
findings is the record evidence at the time of the state court‟s 
adjudication. Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 2011 WL 
1225705, at *11 (Apr. 4, 2011). 
We will grant relief only if Rountree shows that the 
New Jersey state court‟s decision satisfied one of the three 
tests set forth above. 
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IV. 
Rountree petitioned the New Jersey courts for post-
conviction relief on the basis of an alleged violation of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), during the 
proceedings that led to his Camden County sentence. A 
Strickland violation occurs when (1) defense counsel‟s 
conduct falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and (2) there is a reasonable probability (which is more than a 
mere possibility) that but for the counsel‟s failure, the 
proceeding would have come out differently. Id. at 687. The 
New Jersey court rejected that claim, determining that 
although Rountree‟s counsel‟s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, that failing did not 
cause prejudice to Rountree. See State v. Rountree, 906 A.2d 
1124, 1138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
In this habeas petition, Rountree contends that the New 
Jersey court‟s rejection of his Strickland claim was 
unreasonable. We recognize that AEDPA “precludes federal 
habeas relief so long as „fairminded jurists could disagree‟ on 
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the correctness of the state court‟s decision.” Richter, 131 S. 
Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
664 (2004)). Accordingly, we will not surmise whether the 
state court reached the best or even the correct result in 
Rountree‟s case; rather the question we must answer is 
“whether the state court‟s application of the Strickland 
standard was unreasonable”—a standard that is at once 
objective and deferential. Id. at 785. 
Applying AEDPA, we conclude that the New Jersey 
court‟s decision in this case survives review under § 2254. 
Although certain portions of the record can be argued to 
support Rountree‟s petition, it is precisely because 
“fairminded jurists could disagree” with each other that we 
must affirm the state court‟s holding. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 
664. We will therefore affirm the District Court. 
A. 
We begin with the New Jersey state court‟s 
interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington‟s 
“ineffectiveness” prong. See 466 U.S. at 687-688. Under 
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Strickland, Rountree‟s first burden in the state court was to 
demonstrate that his trial counsel‟s conduct “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The test, 
which is “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance,” is applied to “the facts 
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel‟s 
conduct.” Id. at 690. 
To evaluate properly the decisions the state court made 
when faced with Rountree‟s Strickland claim, we must first 
examine the contentions Rountree made there. Rountree 
contended in the state court that his Camden County trial 
counsel failed to render professionally competent assistance, 
because the counsel did not file a motion under Rule 3:25A-1 
of the New Jersey Rules of Court to consolidate into one 
negotiation the plea bargaining over all charges pending in 
both Camden and Essex Counties. He pointed out that his 
counsel and the Camden County judge had on-the-record 
discussions about the possibility of such consolidation, and 
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that the transcript of his (later-withdrawn) guilty plea from 
Camden County gave every indication that the judge would 
have agreed to consolidate, if a motion had been filed. Noting 
that consolidation generally redounds to the benefit of 
criminal defendants, Rountree contended that his counsel‟s 
failure to file the motion—notwithstanding the strong 
indication that it would have been granted—amounted to 
conduct that “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. 
The state court agreed with Rountree. Rountree, 906 
A.2d at 1137. It applied the New Jersey Supreme Court‟s 
decision in State v. Pillot, 560 A.2d 634, 643 (N.J. 1989) 
(construing Rule 3:25A-1 to “enable a defendant to request 
consolidation of charges pending in multiple counties for 
purposes of offering pleas and for sentencing”), and 
concluded that consolidation was legally permissible in 
Rountree‟s case. Because consolidation was legally 
permissible, and given the record‟s strong indication that it 
would have occurred had a motion been filed, the state court 
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held that Rountree‟s counsel had a professional obligation to 
file a Rule 3:25A-1 motion. 
The District Court, which was bound to accept the 
state court‟s conclusions of state law in applying New 
Jersey‟s Rule 3:25A-1, affirmed the state court. See 
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“We have 
repeatedly held that a state court‟s interpretation of state law, 
including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 
conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”) 
(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991), and 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)). After 
accepting that consolidation was possible in Rountree‟s case, 
the District Court concluded that the state court did not apply 
Strickland in an unreasonable fashion when it held that any 
competent New Jersey attorney would have filed a Rule 
3:25A-1 motion in these circumstances. 
We will affirm the District Court for substantially the 
same reasons: we too are bound to accept the state court‟s 
announcement that the Pillot decision obliges New Jersey 
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defense attorneys to move to consolidate plea negotiations 
when the facts indicate the motion will be granted, see 
Richey, 546 U.S. at 76, and we agree that the state court‟s 
interpretation of the facts in this case (i.e., its conclusion that 
a Rule 3:25A-1 motion to consolidate would have been 
granted) was not objectively unreasonable. We also agree 
that, in holding that Rountree‟s counsel‟s conduct fell short of 
what an objectively reasonable New Jersey attorney would 
do, the New Jersey court correctly applied federal law as 
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States. We will 
therefore affirm the state court‟s conclusion that Rountree 
carried his first burden under Strickland v. Washington. 
B. 
We turn now to the “prejudice” prong of Rountree‟s 
Strickland claim. Rountree‟s second Strickland burden in the 
state court was to show that his counsel‟s unprofessional 
conduct prejudiced his case. 466 U.S. at 688. But his burden 
before us is greater: under AEDPA, the question is “„not 
whether a federal court believes the state court‟s 
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determination‟ under the Strickland standard „was incorrect, 
but whether that determination was unreasonable—a 
substantially higher threshold.‟” Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- 
U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Our task is to 
determine only whether the state court adjudication of 
Rountree‟s claim warrants relief under § 2254(d)(1) or 
§ 2254(d)(2). To prevail under those subsections, he must 
persuade us that the New Jersey court‟s holding suffered from 
one of the following failings: (1) it “was contrary to” or 
“involved an unreasonable application of” federal law then 
clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court of 
the United States; or (2) it “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts” in light of the record before the 
state court. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (quoting § 2254(d) and 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that the state court‟s determination of the prejudice 
prong of Rountree‟s Strickland claim was not unreasonable 
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within the meaning of § 2254(d), and therefore we will 
affirm. 
1. 
Intelligent evaluation of the state court‟s application of 
federal law to Rountree‟s case requires at least some 
evaluation of the facts to which the state court applied that 
law. We therefore pause to set forth the legal rules that 
applied in, and the arguments Rountree made before, the New 
Jersey state court. 
Rountree‟s Strickland burden in the state court 
required him to demonstrate that the unprofessional errors of 
his counsel caused him prejudice. 466 U.S. at 688. This is 
because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of 
a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment.” Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 
U.S. 361, 364-365 (1981)). “It is not enough for the defendant 
to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, to meet this 
28 
standard, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 
694 (emphasis added). 
To meet this standard in the New Jersey court, 
Rountree contended that his Camden County counsel‟s failure 
to file a Rule 3:25A-1 consolidation motion increased his 
sentence. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-203 
(2001). In his view, the failure to consolidate the Camden 
County and Essex County charges into one proceeding caused 
him to be convicted of Graves Act crimes on two separate 
occasions, rather than all at once as might have happened 
after a single, lump-sum plea. That is, he argued that because 
he was first convicted of a Graves Act offense in Essex 
County, he arrived at sentencing in Camden County as a 
“previously convicted” Graves Act offender. Because the 
Graves Act imposes heightened penalties for persons 
previously convicted of Graves Act offenses, see N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:43-6(c), Rountree‟s position in the New Jersey 
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court was that the sentencing enhancement applied to him 
was caused by his counsel‟s ineffective failure to consolidate. 
Essential to Rountree‟s position was the implied premise that, 
if offered a single lump-sum plea at a consolidated 
negotiation, he would have accepted it. 
The state court rejected Rountree‟s arguments after 
concluding that Rountree would not have accepted a 
consolidated plea even had he been offered one. Rountree, 
906 A.2d at 1138. The state court based this conclusion on the 
following facts: Rountree went to trial in Camden County 
after his Graves Act conviction for attempted murder in Essex 
County, for which he received a 10-year sentence. Ten years 
is at the low end of the possible punishment under New 
Jersey law for the crimes he faced (i.e., conspiracy to commit 
murder, first-degree attempted murder, second-degree 
aggravated assault, third-degree unlawful possession of a 
weapon, and second-degree possession of a weapon for an 
unlawful purpose). In April of 1996, shortly before 
Rountree‟s Camden County trial, the Camden County 
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prosecutor offered Rountree 20 years, during the first 7 of 
which he would be ineligible for parole. The entire Camden 
County sentence would run concurrently with his 10-year 
Essex County sentence. (The prosecutor further stated that if 
Rountree‟s Essex County conviction were overturned on 
appeal, he would agree to reduce Rountree‟s Camden County 
sentence to nine years, with three years of parole ineligibility. 
This represented the bare minimum sentence that the Graves 
Act would allow.) This April 1996 offer would have settled 
all of Rountree‟s charges, in both counties, for conspiracy to 
commit murder, first-degree attempted murder, first-degree 
armed robbery, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and 
hindering justice, with a 20-year sentence—and substantially 
less, if Rountree were paroled. In the state court‟s view, this 
offer was “as good as he reasonably could have expected if 
the cases had been consolidated for plea negotiation or 
sentencing.” 906 A.2d at 1138. Nonetheless, and against the 
advice of his counsel, Rountree rejected it. 
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Because Rountree rejected an offer that was as good as 
what he could have hoped to have received after 
consolidation, the state court saw no reason to conclude that 
the failure to consolidate caused him any harm. Id. (“There is 
no reason to conclude that he would have accepted the same 
offer if it had been made after an order of consolidation.”). 
On this basis, the state court concluded that his counsel‟s 
ineffective failure to move for consolidation had no “effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding”—i.e., the sentence Rountree 
received after the Camden County jury found him guilty. Id. 
2. 
We turn first to Rountree‟s claim under § 2254(d)(2). 
When reviewing a state court decision for “an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2), we are “bound to 
presume that the state court‟s factual findings are correct, 
with the burden on the petitioner to rebut those findings by 
clear and convincing evidence.” Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 
223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009); see also § 2254(e)(1) (“In a 
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proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State 
court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall 
have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness 
by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
Applying those rules, we will defer to two critical facts 
found by the state court, because we conclude that Rountree 
has not rebutted them by “clear and convincing evidence.” 
§ 2254(e)(1); Simmons, 590 F.3d at 231. The first is the state 
court‟s finding of what might have been offered during a 
consolidated plea negotiation. We will defer to the state 
court‟s conclusion that the April 1996 plea offer Rountree 
received in Camden County (for a 20-year sentence with 7 
years of parole ineligibility, to run concurrently with his 
Essex County sentence) was “as good as he reasonably could 
have expected if the cases had been consolidated for plea 
negotiations or sentencing.” Rountree, 906 A.2d at 1138. We 
accept this conclusion because Rountree has not offered 
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“clear and convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that there was 
a “reasonable probability,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, that 
he could have settled his charges for conspiracy to commit 
murder, first-degree attempted murder, first-degree armed 
robbery, aggravated assault, two distinct firearm offenses, and 
hindering justice, for less than the terms of the April 1996 
offer. We will therefore accept the New Jersey court‟s 
conclusion that the offer Rountree rejected in April 1996 was 
as good as he could have expected to receive at a consolidated 
plea negotiation. 
The second finding of fact to which we will defer is 
the state court‟s finding of how Rountree would have reacted 
to a consolidated offer. We will defer to its conclusion that, 
had consolidation occurred, Rountree would not have 
accepted any offer likely to emerge from it. 906 A.2d at 1138. 
The state court based this finding on its conclusion that any 
offer from a consolidated plea would not have been better 
than the one he rejected in April 1996. See id. (“There is no 
reason to conclude that he would have accepted the same 
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offer if it had been made after an order of consolidation.”). To 
persuade us to reverse, Rountree must offer “clear and 
convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that there was a 
“reasonable probability,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, that if 
consolidation had occurred, he would have accepted an offer 
extending from that agreement. To make this showing, 
Rountree calls our attention to the transcript leading to his 
rejection of the April 1996 offer: 
[Rountree]: I would just like to add that I was 
trying to respond to him that it‟s a thing—it‟s 
not just that I don‟t want to take the deal and 
such, but they tell me that the last six, the last—
since December of 1994 till now . . . all that 
time is not counting [toward my sentence]. The 
time I‟ve been in prison is basically dead time. 
This has a lot to do with me—do you 
understand what I‟m saying? 
 
The Court: It‟s not dead time. It counts toward 
the sentence you are serving [in Essex County], 
sir. It just doesn‟t count on the sentence you 
might get in this case if you‟re convicted. Now, 
the other thing is that‟s the offer. It‟s been made 
to you. It is [your attorney‟s] representation that 
you have no interest in accepting the offer. 
Correct? 
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. . . . 
 
[Rountree]: . . . correct, your honor. 
App. 35. Rountree contends that (1) “the only logical reading 
of the transcript” is that, in saying “they tell me,” Rountree 
was referring to his counsel, and that (2) but for his counsel‟s 
advice he would indeed have accepted the April 1996 offer. 
The state court rejected both of these interpretations. It 
concluded that Rountree‟s contention that he turned down the 
April 1996 offer because he believed that he was not going to 
receive credit for the time he had been serving on his Essex 
County sentence was a “bald assertion,” 906 A.2d at 1133, 
not sufficient to satisfy the “reasonable probability” standard 
Strickland imposes. See 466 U.S. at 694. 
Under AEDPA, the question we must answer is 
whether Rountree has presented clear and convincing 
evidence that the state court‟s conclusion was wrong. 
Simmons v. Beard, 581 F.3d 158 165 (3d. Cir. 2009). At 
bottom, the question of how to read this transcript (i.e., 
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whether or not it indicates that Rountree would have accepted 
the offer but for his counsel‟s advice) is a question of fact that 
can be argued either way. That the transcript can be read in 
more than one way does not—by itself—rise to the level of 
“clear and convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that the state 
court must be deemed unreasonable in choosing one reading 
over another. § 2254(d)(2). In this case, Rountree has offered 
only his assertion, backed by inferences, that when he said 
“they tell me” he referred to his counsel. He has not explained 
why we should ignore the Camden County judge‟s correction 
of his misstatement (“It‟s not dead time”), or how his self-
serving assertion—standing alone—trumps the New Jersey 
court‟s factual finding to the contrary. Simply put, the record 
in this case does not contain the “clear and convincing” 
evidence, § 2254(e)(1), required to meet § 2254(d)(2)‟s high 
standard. 
In sum, we conclude that Rountree has not 
demonstrated that the New Jersey court‟s conclusions were 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
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of the evidence, because he has not rebutted “by clear and 
convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), the state court‟s 
conclusions that (1) the April 1996 offer he rejected was as 
good as he would have received at a consolidated negotiation, 
and (2) he would have rejected the same offer had it occurred 
after an order of consolidation. In light of these facts, which 
we accept, it was not unreasonable for the state court to 
conclude that consolidation would not have made any 
difference in Rountree‟s case. We will therefore affirm the 
District Court‟s denial of relief under § 2254(d)(2). 
3. 
We turn next to Rountree‟s claim under § 2254(d)(1), 
and examine whether the state court‟s decision was either 
“contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of” 
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In making that evaluation, our 
“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was 
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 
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merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 2011 WL 1225705, 
at *8 (Apr. 4, 2011). 
The state court‟s decision was not “contrary to” clearly 
established federal law. § 2254(d)(1). The state court 
correctly articulated the federal standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel as set forth by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Strickland. See Rountree, 906 A.2d at 1133-
1134 (articulating the Strickland standard). And, it correctly 
applied that standard when it inquired into whether Rountree 
had satisfied “both prongs,” and then weighed Rountree‟s 
arguments against the “reasonable probability” test that 
Strickland imposes. Id. at 1138 (applying Strickland‟s 
prejudice prong). 
Nor did it “involve[] an unreasonable application of” 
federal law. § 2254(d)(1). As we have already discussed, 
Rountree has not “rebut[ted] the presumption of correctness” 
of the New Jersey court‟s fact-finding “by clear and 
convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). Under AEDPA, we will 
accept the state court‟s conclusion that Rountree would have 
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rejected any likely consolidated plea offer. That means his 
counsel‟s failure to move to consolidate his plea bargaining 
did not affect the outcome of his Camden County plea 
negotiations. These facts were, under clearly established 
Supreme Court case law, a reasonable and sufficient basis 
upon which to deny his claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 
(“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, 
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal 
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”). 
Because the New Jersey court applied Strickland 
reasonably, it follows necessarily that it did not reach “a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). We 
will therefore affirm the District Court‟s denial of relief. 
In sum, we conclude that Rountree‟s petition does not 
warrant relief under AEDPA. In light of the facts before the 
state court—particularly Rountree‟s rejection of a plea offer 
that was as good as anything that might have come after a 
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motion to consolidate—it was not unreasonable for the state 
court to conclude that Rountree‟s attorney‟s failure to file a 
Rule 3:25A-1 motion had no effect on the sentence he 
received for his Camden County crimes. Although 
“fairminded jurists could disagree” with the way the state 
court weighed the evidence in this case, Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 
664, it was not objectively unreasonable of the state court to 
conclude that, had consolidation occurred, Rountree would 
have rejected any offer it produced, gone to trial, been 
convicted separately for the separate Graves Act crimes he 
did commit, and been sentenced as the repeat-offender that—
at the end of the day—he actually was. 
We will therefore affirm the District Court. 
V. 
On July, 29, 2010, Rountree filed a motion to expand 
the certificate of appealability to include four additional 
issues. We granted the motion, but upon review we conclude 
that the issues raised in the expanded certificate of 
appealability lack merit. First, Rountree complains that his 
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sentence was enhanced based on a judge-made finding that 
his Camden robbery involved a real gun, in violation of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We have held 
that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to convictions that, 
like Rountree‟s, were made final before Apprendi was 
announced. See United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 491 
(3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit. 
Second, Rountree claims that because he was never 
indicted for possession of a firearm, he cannot be sentenced to 
an extended Graves Act sentence. This claim fails because it 
was not exhausted in state court. Further, the Graves Act‟s 
applicability is not limited to those who are indicted and 
convicted for illegally possessing a firearm. It applies equally 
to those who use weapons in the course of another crime. See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43-6(c). 
Third, Rountree contends that the Camden trial judge‟s 
responses to jury questions were improper. However, as the 
District Court held, the state appellate court reasonably 
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concluded that the judge‟s answers did not have a prejudicial 
effect on the jury. 
Finally, Rountree claims that his Camden trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to exclude other crimes 
evidence. The record demonstrates that trial counsel objected 
to the evidence and moved for a mistrial, but the Judge denied 
the motion and directed the jury to disregard the other crimes 
evidence. We agree with the state appellate court that the 
judge‟s limiting instruction forestalled any unjust result. 
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the state court on 
each of the issues raised in Rountree‟s motion for an 
expanded certificate of appealability. 
* * * * * 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
